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I.

Introduction;'
~eliable estimates of the rate of net internal migration to urban

areas in Zaire are difficult to obtain, particularly for recent time periods.
Baute has made estimates of rates of urban population growth for the 1959-

70 period, of which the net in-migration rate is an important component

[1 ].

However, there is evidence that even these estimates of the total

growth rate are subject to large errors since they are based on a compar
ison of administrative censuses, which have shown a marked tendency toward
.
. ot h. er countr i es. l
un d erenumeration
in

.
Such a b.1as seems to b e 1 ess serious

in the 1970 census due to less fear of intimidation, taxation, or forced
labor than it was in the 1959 census, so that any urban growth rate
calculated from these census results may well be an overestimate of the
actual rate.
In addition, to obtain estimates of net in-migration from urhan
growth rates would require information on urban rates of natural increase
and net rates of immigration from abroad to urban areas.

According to the

1970 administrative census [15), such immigration was negligible, but at
least one other source indicates the contrary.

2

Althougi estimates of

age-specific fertility and mortality have been made by Romaniuk Q7] for
both urban and rural areas for the 1955-57 period, these rates may not
be apµlicable to a later time period.

Applying Romaniuk's age-specific

rates to the total numher of persons by sex and age obtained in the 1955-57
demographic inquiry, which appears to .be a better base estimate than the

1959 administrative census, an estimate of the 1970 population was obtained
which fell substantially below (i.e., by over 10 percent) the adjusted
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estimate obtained from the 1970 administrative census.

The latter, 19.7

million persons, represents a correction by Boute for inflated populations
in two provinces.

Hence, it might well be concluded that age-specific

fertility rose and/or age-specific mortality fell during the period from
1955-57 to 1970, making Romaniuk's vital rate estimates inapplicable in
any computation of net in-migration.

Support for this conjecture in the

urban context is provided by the 1967 socio-demograph ic survey of Kinshasa,
which indicates substantial increases in age-specific fertility when
compared with the 1955 inquiry [14].
This is not to say that. rates of net in-migration to urban areas
have been insignificant during the post-Independen ce period.

Even though

intercensal comparisons require arbitrary assumptions and are otherwise
subject to significant errors, socio-demograph ic surveys of individual
cities suggest high rates of net in-migration.

In Kinshasa, the capital

city, for example, this rate has been estimated at about 6 percent per
annum between 1955 and 1967, on the basis of the 1967 socio-demograp hic
survey.
There are a variety of approaches to try to explain rural-urban
migration rates in less developed countries.

One method is to explain

the rate of increase in a given socio-economic group due to net migration
between two points on the basis of income and other variables at the
destination relative to those at the source.

Another approach, which we

adopt in this paper, is to examine determinants of a major variable, rural
employment, in which changes are inversely associated with the net rural
urban migration rate.

Where there are significant errors in variables
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amplified by calculating rates of change, this approach may well have
advantages over the flow determination approach.

Hore specifically, it

may provide a means of obtaining more satistically efficient estimates of
the qualitative association between certain socio-economic or geographic
variables and the decision to migrate, than would be the case if a crude
estimate of net flows were the dependent variable.
In this paper we analyze variables which may be expected to have
opposite qualitative effects on rates of rural-urban migration and rural
employment density.

These variables include factors influencing the

terms of trade faced by farmers such as the monopsony power of individual
buyers, and the cost and availability of transport.

They also include

factors influencing the real opportunity wage in nearby cities such as
money wages and commodity prices.

A once and for all change in these

variables will in a static model with no population growth alter agricultural
employment permanently and bring about a short-run, though significant,
deviation in the rural-urban migration rate from a stationary equilibrium.
In Part II

a simple partial equilibrium model relating agricultural

employment to transport cost and market structure will be presented.

Part

III outlines the empirical procedure used and tests some of the main
relationships derived from the model, based on micro cross-section data
from the 1970 agricultural census of Zaire.
the policy implications of our analysis.

The last section will sunnnarize

..
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II.

Analy tic Frame work
In this paper

we consi der, in addit ion to the usual "pull " facto rs

such as the real urban wage rate, two other sets of
varia bles, which affec t
rural emplo yment chang e and the rural- urhan migra tion
rate throug h the
indiv idual farme r's terms of trade .

The first is trans port cost betwe en

the point where the agric ultur al good is produ ced and
the point of its
final destin ation ; the secon d is monop sony power , i.e.,
the capac ity of
an indiv idual buyer bywi thhol ding deman d, to reduc e
the price of the
agric ultur al good which the farme r offer s.

Such power may arise becau se

the buyer repre sents a company which is imper fectly
comp etitiv e in the
final produ ct marke t for the raw agric ultur al good being
purch ased.

It

may also arise in spite of a high degre e of comp etitio
n among proce ssing
compa nies, simpl y due to a shorta ge of middle men in
the local agric ultur al
area.
Let us begin first by exami ning the~ prior i effec t
of trans port
cost chang e on agric ultur al emplo yment varia tion and
the rate of rural 
urban migra tion.
Trans port cost
Consi der a very simpl e model in wl1ich there are only
two facto rs
of produ ction , land and labor , and one crop, say manio
c.

Assume there is

only one urban cente r and that part of the manio c is
consum ed hy the
farme r and part expor ted to the urban cente r in exchan
i<e for manuf acture d
goods (H-go ods), which are all impor ted from ah road.

Land and labor are

assum ed to be the only input s into farr.dn g and labor
the only input into
trans porti ng.
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The real wage in each location is assumed to be made up of both
M-goods and manioc.

All workers are assumed to have identical tastes

and the real wage may be a single bundle of goods or an indifference
curve composed of equally acceptable bundles.

In all locations, there is

an infinitely elastic supply of labor at a certain specified real wage
as a consequence of unemploymeQt in urban areas.
Suppose that an infinitely elastic supply of both H-goods and manioc
is available in the urban area at a fixed price (determined in world markets)
under perfect competition; then the terms of trade for individual farms
located outside the urban area will differ from this world terms of trade.
The higher the cost of transporting goods from the farm to the urban area,
the more we would expect the selling price of manioc at the farm to fall
below the world price.

By the same token, the higher the cost of hack

haulage, the more we would expect the cost of M-goods in the farming area
to exceed their world price.

Thus, the higher the cost of transport, the

higher will be the price of M-goods relative to manioc at the farm.
Because of this difference in the terms of trade due to variation
in transport cost, different farms will have different costs of labor
(explicit or implicit) in terms of manioc.

Wage rates expressed in terms

of manioc are measured along the vertical axes in Figures 1 and 2, taken
frbm Pease' s analysis [11].

The slopes of the budget lines in these dia

grams are equal to -P, where Pis the ratio of the price of M-goods to
the price of manioc.

In Figure 1, it is shown that, when this slope is

steeper due to higher transport costs, a higher real wage (expressed in
terms of manioc) must be offered in order for the laborer to consume the
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same real wage bundle.

The same is true even when the budget lines need

only be tangent to the same indifference curve rather than intersect at
the same point as shown in Figure 2.

In both these diagrams,

w2

re

presents the cost of labor on a farm with relatively high transport costs
and

w1

the cost of labor on a farm with relatively low transport costs.
Let us assume that the expected real wage rate in the city (expressed

in terms of manioc),

w0 , is equivalent in utility terms tc

t:!2 real

wage rates on the farms, so that the budget line for the urban wage is
either tangent to the same indifference curve or intersects the other
budget lines at the same point.

Then, under the standard Harris-Todaro

assumption [6], there will be no incentive to migrate provided the average
product of labor on a family farm exceeds the equivalent in utility of the
expected real wage bundle in the urban area.

In fact, given the strong

tendency for extended families to share in Zaire, urban relatives may he
allowed to remigrate to the family farm under these conditions.

Since the

region associated with a specified total transport cost is finite, agricul
tural employment in a given region will be determined by the condition
that the average product of labor be equal in utility terms to the expected
urban opportunity wage, i.e., the expected utility of the real· income that
an adult would receive were he to move to the city.

The higher the

transport cost associated with the farming area, the higher the relative
price of the M-goods relative to manioc.

This implies that the average

product of labor (equal in utility terms to the urban opportunity wage)
must also be higher in this area and, other things being equal, employment
per unit of land (standardized for quality) will be lower given diminishing
returns.

7

Manioc

FIGURE 1

Wage Bundle
a

L-------L.-----•-----....;:-.--- ----M-Goods
m

Ma ioc

FIGURE 2

~

Locus of Equally Acceptable
Real Wage Bundles

M-Goods
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This inverce association between transport cost and intensity of
cultivation also exists in the case where hired labor is employed on farm:;.
In this case, the profit-maximi:dng farmer will hire lahor up to the point

where the marginal rather than average product of labor is equal to the cost
of lahor in a given region.

This cost is once again determined hy an

equilibrium condition which equates utility obtained from lahor in rural
with the expected utility gained from labor in urban areas.

Aside from

the fact that the land-labor ratio tends to be higher in hired labor agri
culture than on a family farm and rental returns must be assigned to land
owners, the qualitative relationship between agricultural employment and
transport cost remains the same.

The higher the transport cost, the

higher will be equilibrium marginal product of labor and the lower will
be employment per unit of land given diminishing returns.
If, in some region, there is a maximum marginal or average value
product of labor at a given net price of manioc and the cost of labor
determined hy the urban opportunity wage exceeds this maximum, land there
will not be cultivated.

Note that a region may lie uncultivated even if

there is no limit to the marginal or average product of labor in that
region.

If the import costs are so high that the cost of transporting a

unit of manioc to the urban area exceeds its value in the urhan area, then
it is impossible to purchase }1-goods with that region's budget.

Workers

who demand some ~1-goods as part of their real wage hundle will be unwilling
to work in such a region making cultivation of its land impossible.

9

Suppose that (a) all land in the economy were identical except
for transport cost and (b) the cost of transport ing manioc and M-goods
were simply a function of the distance from the urban area; then the amount
of farm labor, manioc output, and possibly rental return per unit of land
would all decline as the distance from the urban area increased .

If the

economy were large enough, there would be a frontier of cultivati on at
which the value of land would be zero and heyond it no cultivati on would
take place.

The fact that, in this sense, some land is too costly to

cultivate , not that there is a "surplus" of land, may well account for the
large areas of Zaire which remain totally uncultiva ted.
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Monopsony
The inverse association between agricultural employment and transport
cost described above may be even stronger when monopolistic elements in the
market for agricultural produce are allowed for.

The marketing system in

Zaire is a complicated one, with some parts of it ch?racterized by intensive
competition, but other parts apparently monopolistic.
ment that has been most frequently described
place, with market women selling side by side.

The competitive ele

occurs in the town market
The marketing element, how

ever, which has been less well studied, but is more relevant to a discussion
of the transport network, involves the role of the larger middlemen.

There

do not appear to be many middlemen who go from village to village buying
produce.

Truck costs are high even at the point of importation, and a good deal

higher in the interior.
truckers.

Imperfect capital markets, then, restrict the number of

In addition, the price of a given agricultural good may be artificially

depressed not because of a shortage of self-employed middlemen but because the
only middlemen are representatives of a processing firm (e.g. the cotton cartel)
which is the sole producer or nearly sole producer of the final product derived
from the raw agricultural good.
Throughout Zaire, food crops are sold by individual family farmers to
middlemen in exchange for M-goods.

With a breakdown in the transport system

in the post-Independen ce period, the after-cost price offered by these middle
men for the crops they purchase has declined relative to the urban price for
two reasons: (1) transport to urban areas is less frequently available, hence
storage costs for middlemen have risen;
higher per ton-mile when available.

(2) the direct cost of transport is

In addition, the middlemen are able to

--I
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some degree to decrease the price they pay for food crops by withholding
demand.

Such monopsony power exists because there are few middlemen rela

tive to individual producers or limited competition among processors of the
raw agricultural good.
To maximize his or his company's profits

n, the middleman must choose

a price such that the following expression is maximized:

(1.1)

where

p

u

=

urban price of the agricultural good (fixed)

pi = price paid by middler::an to seller at

di = distance:
t

=

i

i

to market

per ton kilometer transport cost (including storage cost),
assumed constn.nt

qi = output of seller at

i

From this maximization process, we obtain the relationship
P
(1.2)

u

- d t

i

Pi == 1 + 1/ e.
l

where

e

1

is the elasticity of supply of the individual producer.

(1.3)

Then we may write the expression for
(1.4)

Pi

as

Let
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Provided the elasticity of supply ispositive but less than infinity, the coefficier
B will be less than unity.

Therefore, in this case of pure monopsony,

the price received by the producer will be lower than in the case where
there is no monopsony power and the producer's price is simply
(1.5)

P

i

=

u - dit •

P

Though lower, the price of producers is less sensitive to transport cost
changes with pure monopsony than with no monopsony at all.

From (1.4),

it is clear that a reduction (increase) in unit transport cost,

t,

will

result in a less than proportional increase (decrzase) in the price received
by the producers.

Part of the reduction in unit transport cost,

t,

leads to a rise in the profits of the monopsonist while part of a rise
in

t

comes out of his profits.

Thus, with the number of buyers constant

in a given region, monopsony reduces the sensitivity of agricultural employ
ment to changes in transport cost, although it also implies a lower level
of agricultural employment at a fixed level of transport cost.
with inter-regional mobility of buyers.

This result change~

A localized improvement_ in trans-

port can further increase in some regions the monopsony profits of truckers
or the company they represent.

Because of scarce capital, the truckers or

the company can choose to purchase only in those areas where transport costs
are relatively low and profits relatively high, leaving the more remote areas
with fewer transport alternatives.

In spite of the assumptions of the inter

nationally determined terms of trade and the real wage, it is possible that a
region not directly covered by transport investment can be harmed by the
investment, and as a consequence have a higher rate of outmigration.

Truckers

will be induced into the region in which the investment takes place because of
higher monopsony profits.

l3

III.

Empirical Tests
The 1970 FAO agricultura l census of Zaire[l3J provides a statistical

base for testing some of the relationship s between transport cost, monopsony
power, the urban wage and the intensity of cultivation discussed in the pre
vious section.

This survey consisted of 20,000 agricultura l units in the

traditional sector, which were interviewed from March ,1970, to March ,1971. It
comprised

approximate ly 1/2 per cent of all units in the sector, and was

selected randomly. 3 Our sample consists of a 10 per centrandom sample of this
entire survey.
We have investigate d three main lines of argument, all of which relate
the intensity of cultivation to the profitabili ty of agricultura l or urban
employment.

The first has to do with the cost of transport; the second with

the effects of commercial middlemen and of monopolisti c buyers of agricul
tural produce; and the third with the alternative of urban employment.

In

each case, we can compare the response of women and men to these economic
incentives.

To the extent that the determinant s of the intensity of cultiva

tion differ by sex, rural-urban migration pattems by sex are also likely to
differ.

As well, we compare the response on those farms that produce for

market with those that' do not.
Our first hypothesis predicts that transport costs per commodity unit are
negatively associated with employment per unit of cultivated land and positively
associated with physical output per employed person in agriculture .

The higher

the transport cost to the nearest market, the less favorable will be the terms
of trade which the farm faces and the greater will have to be the physical
return to labor to compensate for rural-urban price differences .
Direct estimates of transport cost cannot be made.

Moreover, even if
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conventional source-to-desti nation estimates of haulage cost could be ob
tained, these would not adequately represent the full cost of transport as
reflected in the real income of the individual farming unit.

There is a

great deal of transp·ort cost which is absorbed by the individual producing
unit.

If, for example, farmers must transport their produce to roads or

river ports where trucks or boats come only infrequently, there may well be
substantial time lost in household activities and deterioration of produce
prior to its being sold to the shipper.

These costs are not incurred by the

ship operator or trucker in hauling the good.

For these reasons, we utilize

proxy variables for total transport cost per physical unit of the good.
One proxy for total transport cost (including that which must be imputed
to the individual farming unit) is distance.

We expect the distance a farm

lies off a single straight road leading to an urban area to rise, the farther
a given point on the road is from the urhan area.

From this it follows th.c1t

transport cost increases more than proportionately with distance, as access
roads and frequency of trucks decline, and as storage and deterioration costs rise.
Transport costs, however, are not adequately represented by the
distance to the nearest market.

For this reason, we have also included

a number of dummy variables reflecting the type of transport used by the
farmer to carry his produce to the nearest mark.et.
have certain important defects.

These variahles, however.

For one thing, some of the transport

costs are borne directly by the farmer, while others are borne by the
middleman and reflected in the price of marketed surplus.

For another,

the method of transporting agricultural produce to the first location of
sale might obscure subsequent transactions and the cost of reaching the
final destination.

A unit may use a very primitive form of trans-
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port s~ch as the b~ck of a ~an to get his product to market, and yet the
market may be located next to a railroad track or a river.

In this case,

a relatively sophisticated transport mode would be used across most of the
distance to the final destination.

In many instances, farmers situated in

the more remote areas would not transport the goods to market themselves,
but rather wait for middlemen to approach, in which case no mode of trans
port would be specified on the questionnaire.

On balance, however, we would

expect employment per unit of cultivated land to be higher on farms using
more advanced transport than the back of man or a push cart.
Our second major hypothesis suggests that monopsony power either by
middlemen or by agricultural processors should lower the price received by
the farmer, decreasing the intensity of cultivation.
effect of monopsony in two ways.

We have measured the

The first method uses a dummy variable for

those farms that sell to a monopolist in the final product market and can be
interpreted as part of the long run terms of trade.
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The second uses the

terms of trade at the time of the produce sale, as measured by the relative
price of manufactured goods plus transport cost to the average price of
marketed surplus.

To the extent that monopsonistic middlemen do not represent

monopolists in the processed goods market, this "short run" terms of trade
should, but the dummy variable should not, be significant.
Finally, we test our third hypothesis--that a higher real urban
wage is inversely related to the intensity of cultivation--by using both
an urban wage in terms of manioc and the relative price of manufactured
goods to manioc in the city.
ur}ian unemployment.

Ideally, we would include the effect of

Accurate estimates, however, of the urban employment

rate are available for only one city, Kinshasa, and even here it is question
able whether this is a complete indicator of employmen t opportun ities

[12] ·

Whether the data comes from the agricultu ral census or from other sources,
a number of the variables we are using might be subject to extreme errors in measure
ment.

For example, the survey units were asked the number of weeks each member

worked between visits.

It is highly unlikely that the responden ts could

give accurate retrospec tive estimates of weeks worked particula rly over a
time period as .long as 3 or 4 months.

On

the other hand, a variable such as

the average number of persons per visit would be subject to considera bly less
bias.

And, although there is some problem in estimatin g age, a more accurate

measure of employmen t than weeks worked may be simply the number of persons
15-64 years of age, which is also provided in the survey.

Farm size is among

the other variables subject to considera ble measureme nt error;

In

addition, the correct interpret ation of the transport mode dummies, listed in
Table 1, cannot be verified.

Unfortun ately, a number of the variables we need cannot be obtained from
the available data.
good's price.

Only in nine cities is it possible to estimate a manufactu red

Since budget studies do not exist even in these cities, we must

confine ourselves to making a compariso n of individua l agricultu ral and manu
factured goods prices rather than comparing price indices.

We chose simply

a ratio of the price of a frequentl y used clothing item to the price of a
frequentl y used food item.

Wage rate data are available for only twenty-on e cities.

Distance is estimated by the number of kilometer s from an administr ative
region's center to the nearest of the twenty-on e cities for which we had
salary data.
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Table 1
Transport and Narket Structure Variahles

T

1

Unit uses "back of man" to take marketed surplus to first location
of sale

T2

Unit uses "beast of burden" to take marketed surplus to first
location of sale

T
T

3
4

Unit uses "cart" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale
Unit uses "bicycle" to take marketed surplus to first location of
sale

T
T

5
6

Unit uses "truck" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale
Unit uses "railroad" to take marketed surplus to first location of
sale

T

7

Unit uses "other" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale

v1

Unit is part of a commercial or industrial enterprise

v

Unit delivers part or all of its produce to an agricultura l industry

2

v3

llnit delivers its produce to a monopoly

V
4

Unit's produce buyer takes an interest in the unit's management

To sum up, in our regression equations we can use as explanatory
variables distance, dummies for the mode of transport, dummies for market
structure, the short run terms of trade, the real urban wage rate and a
proxy for the relative price of the manufactured good.

We also included

farm area, as an important determinant of intensity of cultivation.

Most

cultivated area in Zaire is communally allocated among different households
by the tribe.

Wage labor is rare.

We expect, then, the farm area variable

to be inversely related to intensity of cultivation.

Those areas which tend

to have higher land allotments per adult, such as in the savannah or where
soil quality is low, should be associated with lower intensity of cultivation.
We compared the role of men to that of women in Zaire agriculture
by considering three different dependent variables:
per hectare; males

15-64

per hectare; and females

total persons.

15-64

15-64

per hectare.

These variables are essentially labor force rather than employment measures,
but are reasonable proxies for the latter.

This breakdm-m by sex is espe

cially important considering the descriptions in much of the anthropological
literature.
The system of shifting cultiva~ion, which characterizes traditional
agriculture

in Zaire, involves farming an individual plot only temporarily

until its natural fertility declines.

At that time, the farming household

puts a new plot of land under cultivation, and abandons the old one.

Each

year there is some clearing of forest and underbrush so that new plots can
be put under cultivation.

Although there are major tribal exceptions, these tasks

are generally said to be reserved for men.

On the other hand, most of the planting,

maintenance, and harvesting tasks are performed by women.
the work of men prevents a

Thus, although

long-run fall in crop yields, nearly all tasks vital to short-run production
in agriculture seem to be performed by women.

In fact, most studies indicate

that the hours put in by men in agriculture fall substantially short of those
put in by women.
Since functions performed by the two sexes differ significantly, an
attempt should be made to explain male and female employment separately, as
well as total employment [9].
differ.

Rates of migration, by implication, will also

It may be argued that some of the independent variables of our

equations have a significant effect on male employment but not on female,
and vice versa.

The real wage rate in the nearest city (expressed in terms

of agricultural goods), for instance, may well be negatively associated with
male but not female employment in a given agricultural region.

Women are not

generally formally employed in urban areas, and hence,the real opportunity
wage rate in a proximate urban area is not an indication of the opportunity
cost of their remaining in agriculture. Since work involving machinery tends
to be limited to men, we would expect the mechanical transport mode dummies to have

a greater positive association with male than they do with female employment.

We have also divided the production units into groups that market some
produce during the time period covered by the survey and those that do not.
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Again, we would expect the two groups to respond differently to production
and migration incentives.

Production on a farm which is outside the market

economy might not react strongly to a deterioration in the terms of trade.
On the other hand, family members can still migrate in hopes of obtaining the
urban wage.

In fact, migration might be the only possible way to improve

income, if the unit is unable to sell produce.

The first equation estimated took the form
(2.4)

E.

lill

b 0 + b 1wJ.m + b q. + b d..
2 Jm
3 lJm

2

4
7
+ b H. + I b +kVk. + I b kTk.
4 1m
k=l 4
1m
k=l 8+
im

where E. is employment (male, female, or total) per hectare on a farm unit i;
l
w. is the real wage expressed in terms of food in city j; q. is the price of
J
J

manufactured goods relative to the price of food in city j; d .. is the
lJ
average distance between farm unit i and city j;
H. is the average hee
l

tares per farm unit; Vki are dummies for market structure; and Tki are dummies
for transport mode.
market or not.

In each case, m defines whether the farm produces for the

The hypothesized sign of the coefficient for thew. variable
J

in the equation is negative, that of the relative price q. positive and that
J

of H. negative.
l

One would expect the coefficients for the more primitive

transport modes to be smaller than the less primitive, and one would expect
the coefficients for the second and third market structure variables to. be
negative, but ambiguous for the first and fourth.

If d ..
lJ

2

is a proxy for

the cost of shipping goods, we would expect its coefficient to be negative.
The equations for total, male and female employment per cultivated
hectare were fitted to data for 1313 farms with marketed surplus and 724
without (a lOper eent random sample of the original survey).

The independent

variable coefficients for equations based on farms with marketed surplus,
together with the coefficients of determination, are presented in Table 2.
The equations based on data from farms that did not sell for the market are
not reproduced at this stage, but only later with a better specification of
the model.

The coefficients of determination are very high for cross-section

data, and the F ratios are well above the 1 percent critical value.
In every equation predicting employment per hectare, at least four

Table 2
Employment per Cultivate d Hectare of Units with Marketed Surplus

Independe nt
Variables
Farm area
b

Total Adults (15-64) / Total Males (15-64)/ Total females (15-f
hectare
hectare
hectare
-.007 (11.533)** *
-.004 (11.667)** * -.003 (10. 088) ***

Wage ./P(food) .
J

C

J

P(mfg)./P (food).
J

d

f

J

·Distance squared
Back transport

e

.452

(1. 641)

.094

(.613)

.358

-.084

(1.322)

-.042

(1.174)

-.042

-3xl0 -5

(1. 500)

-7xl0

(.272)

.560

, o"'"4

-.L

.944

(2.500)**
(.373)

.385

Truck transport

32. 309

(3.579)***

19.197

(3. 804) *** 13.112

Other transport

24.549

(2.332)**

16.058

(2. 729)**

Sell to monopoli st -6.427

(2.573)**

-2. 713

(1. 943)

Intercept
R2
F(DF=8,13 04)

a

(2.248)*
(1.154)
-5

8.491
-3. 714

45.255

22.198

23.056

.113

.091

.092

20.684***

16.312 ***

16. 4 ]Lt*'''

(3.500)** *
(.383)
(2.515)**
(1. 397)
(2.574)**

aThe t-ratios are in parenthes es. One asterisk (*) means that the coefficie nt
is significa ntly non-zero at the five per cent level using a two-taile d test,
two asterisks (**) represent a one per cent level, and three(*** ) asterisks
represent a .001 level.
b

Salary data for twenty-on e cities taken from Kazadi wa Dile, Politique s Salariale s
/
.,,,
,,...
----------- ----·_et Developpe ment_~~-~ ub:\:_iq~e Democrati que du Congo, Reche~che
s Afri cai.nes XV
(Paris: Editons Universit aires and Institut de Recherche s Economiou es et
Sociales, Universi te Lovanium de Kinshasa, 1970), Annexe T. Price of food is the
p·rice of manioc in the zone nearest the city as estimated by the Institut Nationale
de la Statistiq ue.
cMfg. price= price of clothing in nine cities.
d

The distance variable gives the number of km's from the zone centers to the
nearest of twenty-on e cities for which we had salary data.

Notes continued on next page.

Notes to Table 2

e,,O t h er " transport refers mainly to river transport.
f

We originally had three monopoly type variables, of which the second was
statistically most significant:
(i)

Does the unit deliver part of all of its produce to an agricultural
industry?
(ii) Is the enterprise to which produce is delivered a monopoly?
(iii) Does the enterprise to which produce is delivered take an interest
in the unit's management?

n
variables are significantly non-zero near the five per cent level when a
two-tailed test is used and many are highly significant.

The most startling

among these is the average farm size variable.While the coefficient has the
predicted sign, its significance is probably partly due to measurement error.
Hectarage appears both on the right hand side of the equation and in the
denominator of the dependent variable.

Therefore, any error in measurement

creates a negative bias in the coefficient.

The distance variable has the

hypothesized sign and is significant for adults and women, and near the five per
cent

level of signifi~ance using a one-tailed test for men.

Of the trans-

port mode variables, preliminary tests showed that only three had coefficients
.
6
at least as large as their standard errors in absolute magnitude,
and henc~

these alone were included in the regression equations presented in Table 2.
Still, the relative magnitude of the coefficients is in line with our
hypothesis.

The coefficients for the more advanced transport modes, "truck"

and "other," are greater than that for the "back of man" mode.

Moreover,

the coefficients for "truck" and "other" are for the most part statistically
significant.

Only one of the market structure variables--the proportion of

units selling their produce to a monopolistic enterprise--has a coefficient
greater than its standard error.

It was always of the hypothesized sign and

both more significant and stronger for women than for men •
. The urban real wage and the relative urban prices are neither-of the
predicted sign, nor significant.

It is possible that those farms which are

able to market a surplus are located in relatively fertile areas.

The

direction of causation might run from relatively productive cultivation to
relatively high population density, high opportunity cost of labor and
a high urban wage.

For the farms which did not produce a marketed surplus,

the opposite and expected sign for the real urban wage was obtained.

In

this case, it is likely that the urban wage ,acted to pull labor into the
city, rather than in response to agricultural productivity.
To go into more detail, it is useful to contrast the male and female
equations.

The independent variables explain slightly less of the total

variations in male and female employment per hectare than they do in the
case of total adult population.

As hypothesized, the magnitude and

statistical significance of the coefficients vary
First of all, those transport variables whicl1

';,;'E

between the two sexes.

Kould expect to be more

important for men than for women have both larger and more significant
coefficients for men.

The t-ratios and coefficients for "truck" and "other"

transport are higher, whereas those for "back of man" are lower in the equation 2xplaining male employment.

This is quite consistent with wonen

transporting produce primarily by back, rather than by truck.
Again, as predicted, whether or not a farm sells to a monopolist has a
greater and more significant impact.on women, who supposedly do more of the agri
cultural work than do men.

If we are correct in interpreting the real urban ware

as a proxy for soil fertility, we obtain as expected, a more significant association
between the urhan wage rate and female emplovrnent than between the urban wage
rate and male emnlovment.

This is consistent with the view that women have a

great deal of earning abilitv in rural areas.

Rv contrast, men will migrate to

the citv in response to a smaller change in the expected real wage than will women,
with little effect on agricultural emplovment.
Similarlv, distance from market has a larger and more significant impact
on female employment than male.

This relationship is perfectlv consistent

with our interpretati on of distance as one component of the long-run terms
of trade.

It could also, however, be indirect evidence of the monopsony

model presented in Section II.

In that case, distance will affect employ

ment through its association with transport cost by affecting the number
of monopsonist s.

Thus we would expect a much larger number of buyers close

to the city where monopsony profits are relatively high than far away from
the city where monopsony profits are relatively low.

This implies that

total transport cost per physical unit measured by distance will have a
negative impact on agricultura l employment independent of any effect on the
terms of trade.
One way of testing for this is to include the terms of trade in the
regression equation, along with a separate distance variable.
specificatio n is derived as follows.

One possible

Suppose that price P(M). of a given
l

manufacture d good on farm i imported from region j is given by P(M).
l

~

P(M) .+td ..
J

where P(M). is the price of the manufacture d good in city j, d .. is the dis]
l]

tance between i and j, and t the transport cost per kilogram-ki lometer.
It is assumed that the general employment per cultivated hectare equa
tion takes the form

E.

lm

where C is a row vector of coefficient s; V' is a column vector of transportmode and market-stru cture variables; and P(A). is the average price of marketed
l
surplus received by the unit i.

All the other variables are as before. When

the equation determining P(M). is substituted into this equation we have
l

E.

lill

= µO +

µ H.

1

1m

+ µ w.

2 Jm

+ µ q.

3 Jm

+ µ P(M). /P(A).

4

Jm

1m

+

JJ4td..
2
l]ID +
d
+ C·V'
P(A).lill
µ5 l..
]ill
m

The hypothesize d signs of the coefficient s in this equation are:

l]

<

0

<

n

>
<

fl

>

0

<

()

The results of estimating tl,is equation for total, male" and female
adult population are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
A comparison of these tables corroborates our previous findings,
hut also provides new insight into the interpretation of cost and avail
ahil itv of transport.

First, a summary of the conclusions that carry

over from the earlier discussion.

The long- run terms of trade measured

by distance and the monopoly dummy continue to be more significant for
women tt1an for men.

Horeover, as one would expect, these terms of trade

are consi<lerahly more important for farms that market a surplus than for
those that have a potential hut no actual surplus.
of trade, however,

are generally not significant.

he due to one of several difficulties.

The short-run terms
This weak effect could

For one thing, the price data

is suhject to short-run random fluctuations which do not influence employ
ment and production decisions in the house 110ld.

For anot 1wr, as we.

ar~ued ahove, the costs borne by the farmer are not fully measured ½y the
prices paid or received.

The various transport mode dummies are an

attempt to allow for these non-market transport costs.
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Table 3
Farms with Marketed Surplus:
Distance and Terms of Trade Effects

Independent
Variables

Dependent Variabl.es
Males/
hectare

Adults/
hectare

Farm area

(11.583)***

-.007

a

(10. 667)***

-.004

Females/
hectare
-.003 (10.089);

.179

(.514)

-.074

(.382)

.254

(1.260)

.028

(.261)

.028

(. 46 7)

-.000

(.001)

bP(mfg)./P(a).

-.020

(1. 292)

-.012

(1. 455)

-.007

(.840)

bDistance/P(a)].. x 1000

5.5x10

-4

(. 809)

2.6x10

-4

(2.167)*

WagejP(food) j
P (mfg) . /P (food)
J

J

j

].

Distance squared
Back transport

-1. 3x10

(.320)

.816

-4

(.684)

-5

(1. 333)

.346

(.243)

-4x10

2.9x10 -4 (.744)
-9xl0

-5 (3.000):1

Truck transport

32.330

(3.546)***

19.429.

(3.812)*** 12.901

Other transport

24.656

(2. 337) **

16.242

(2.575)**

8.414

Sell to monopolist

-6.596

(2.613)**

-2.764

(1. 960)*

-3.831

Intercept

46.291

22. 961

23.328

.114

.093

.092

R2
F(DF = 10,1302)

16. 713

***

***
13.284

(. 319)

.469

13.241

(2.449)-;
(1. 380)

(2.627)~

***

aThe t-ratios are in parentheses. One asterisk(*) means that the coefficient
is significantly non-zero at the five per cent level using a two-tailed test,
two asterisks (**) represent a one per centlevel, and three (***) asterisks
represent a .001 level.
bP(a).]. is a weighted average of local crop prices, using local marketed surplus
weights.

.

Farms with ~-Jo :fark.ete<l Surplus:
Distance and Terms of Trade Effectsa
Dependent Variables
Adults/
- - - - MalesF ·--- - - - Females/
_V_a_r_i_a_b_l_e_s_______--"-h=-=e=-=c=-=t=--=a=--=r~e,~------~h=-=e::..:c::..:t:..:a:.:r:..:e:.....___
hectare
Farm area
-.029 (12.973)***
-.014
(11.950)**~*----.0-15 (1n:~~-)_*_*_*
Independent

Wage/P(food).
J

-.986

J

P(mfg)./P(food).
J

b

J

P(mfg.)j/P(a)i

.280
-.052

(1. 922)

-.572

694)

.156

(1.

(2.120)*

-. 034

(2.073)*
(l. 757)

-.414
.124

(1. 7.2 7)

(2.542)**

-.018

(l.237i

.001

(.579)

.'101

(1.14H)

-.000

( .071)

-.000

(1. 500)

-.000

(1.600)

-.000

(1. 333)

5.237

(1. 406)

• 788

(.394)

4.449

(1.956)

G.rruck transport

20.131

(1. 022)

17.910

(1.691)

2.221

( .18.5)

'Dther transport

21.058

(1. 300)

20.053

(2.303)*

1.004

( .102)

%ell to monopolist

-1. q35

(.368)

• 477

-2.412

(.752)

b Distance/P(a).X(lOOO)
].

Distance squared
~ack transport

Intercept

F(DF=lO, 713)

(.lfi9)

79.934

39.303

39.631

• 206

.181

.156

18.446***

15. 777***

13.221***

aThe t-ratios ar'e in parentheses. One asterisk (*) means t!1at the coefficient
is significantly non-zero at the five per cent level using a p:o-tailed test,
two asterisks (**) represent a oneper cent level, and three ('~**) asterisks
represent a .001 level.
bP(a)i is a weighted average of local crop prices, using local marketed
surplus weights.
C

The trans port would he used if the unit had marketed surplus c-ven though
it currently does not.

dUnit would sell part of its marketed surplus to a monopolist if it had any.

If we consider Table

tf,

showing the results for farms without

market sales, we observe that hoth "truck." and "other" transport are
significantly more important for m~n than for women.

It seems reason

able to interpret this finding as an indicator of migration routes
rather than as a proxy for the cost of transporting produce.
after all, are not marketing a surplus.

These farms,

It is very likely that men

migrating to urban areas congregate at ports and railway stops, where
there is cheap and easy transport.

Women, however, respond less to the

availability of long distance modes of transport.

In Table 3, where

transportation facilities can represent both the migration network and
the cost of shipping goods, we expect and find a large incn~ase in the
importance of "truck" and "other" trans port modes for women, and a much
smaller change in their impact on men.

This again is consistent with

women's role in agriculture.
A second indication that commercialized and non-commercialized
farmers behave differently, is shown by the effect of tl-ie urban real
wage.

The non-commercialized farmers, who are not increasing their real

income through trade, are more likely to migrate in response to urban
salaries.

This is true for both men and women, though the relation is

stronger for men.

In fact, the wage variables are insignificant in

Table 3, partly because fertile areas with more commerctalized farms
are likely to influence urban salaries, so that the direction of causality
is. reversed.

Finally, we have not been able adeauate ly to test the hypothe sis
that increasi ng transpo rt costs and increasi ng distanc e, controll ing for
terms of trade, should increase monopson y power.

To the extent that the

transpo rt mode variable s are proxies for the terms of trade faced hy
farmers with marketed surplus , the distance variable is a sign of increasi ng
monopson y with distance from the city.
it has

importan t policy implica tions.

middleme n remains fixed.

While this conclusi on is specula tive,
Suppose the total number of rural

Then the improvem ent in transpo rt infrastr ucture

in a given region will be expected to increase employm ent in that region
by attracti ng middlem en and decrease it in others by drawing them away.
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IV.

Conclusio ns

In this paper, we have examined the qualitativ e relations hip between
the intensity of cultivati on in rural areas on the one hand and a set of
variables linked to monopsony power, transport cost, and earnings foregone
as a result of not migrating to the city.

For the most part, our empirical

results based on straight cross-sec tion data taken from the 1970 agricul
tural census were consisten t with the hypothesi zed qualitati ve relations hips.
However, any policy implicatio nsdrawn from these results regarding the
effect of changes in certain variables on agricultu ral emplovmen t

over

time, let alone the rate of rural-urb an migration , are subject to con
siderable qualifica tion.

To begin with, it should be recognize d that our

model omits certain critical variables , in particula r soil quality, in its
explanati on of the intensity of cultivatio n.

In addition, distortio n is

created because a great many of the individua ls in the data set have initiated
but not completed a step-wise migration process.

In other words, a model

which assumes an equilibriu m between rural and urban labor returns is being
tested in a context in which a substanti al disequilib rium may well exist.
For example, there is a strong positive associatio n between adult males per
cultivate d hectare and the availabil ity of truck and river transport .

Yet,

the available evidence indicates that this is true not simplv because
transport cost is relativel y low and the terms of trade relativel y favorable
along roads or at river ports, but because moving to such places represents a logical first stop for a person migrating from the hinterlan d to
an urban area.

Hence, increasin g the number of ports or roads may, contrary

to our hypothesi s, decrease rural employmen t in the long-run and significa ntlv
increase the rural-urb an migration rate in the short and intermedi ate term.
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A number of rohust conclusions have, however, emer~ed from onr
work.

It seems to be unequivocally true that the cost of transport

is inversely associated with the long-run number of adult women per
cultivated hectare.

Since this relationship is either

positive or, if

negative, substantially weaker in the case of males, we would expect in
creases in the cost and decreases in the availability of transport to
decrease the long-run ratio of adult women to adult men in agriculture.
Under these conditions, we would expect a lower ratio of men to women
outmigrants from the rural sector, even though the effect of changes in
the availability and cost of transport on ti,e overall rate of migration
remains ambiguous.

This helps explain why tl-ie proportion of women in

adult urban populations rose substantially he tween 1959 and 1970 [l, P • 817 J•
During this period, there was a marked deterioration in the transport
infrastructure and rising transport cost in rural areas f8], which may
well have contributed to the altered pattern of sex-seled::ive migration.
The qualitative effect of changes in monopsony power on long-run
labor-ir:tensity in agriculture is much more .clearcut than that of transport
cost or availability.

If they sold their produce to a monopolistic proces

sor, farms with positive marketed surplus, according to our results, had
significantly lower numbers of total adults per cultivated hectare and
women per cultivated hectare.

The number of mP.n per cultivated hectare>

was also lower if the farm with nositive marketed surnlus sold to a
monopolistic processor, though not significantly so 1.)y conventional
statistical stanc.En-,i·'..

Hence, our evidence indicates that increased

competition in food processin~ voul<l incrPaSP intensity of ~1ltivation in
agricultun, and decrease the short-run rate of outmigration from rural
areas.
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1
The 1959 administrative census was part of a series of population
registers used as a basis for taxation and forced labor during the period
of Belgian control.
counted.

Hence, there was a definite incentive to avoid being

Moreover, there is a tendency to map boundaries poorly in ad

ministrative censuses.

William Duncan of the U.S. Bureau of the Census

has pointed out to us that experiments in Ghana have demonstrated that using
administrative "village" listings as ppposed to full cartographic mapping
can result in underenumeration

2

of about 25 per cent.

There is evidence that innnigration had an important impact on

population growth between 1959 and 1970 in Zaire.

Even though the 1970

administrative census lists only 938,000 foreign born, Hugh Brooks,
et. al. in another source (13] indicate that during 1%6-67 alone 728,000
refugees entered Zaire from neighboring countries.

3 An agricultural unit is defined as a unit under a single direction
and on which the same aids to production are used.

Each of these units was

visited three times during the census year by an interviewer.

In addition,

a final quick visit was made to all units hy the interviewers to complete
certain data on the third questionnaire.

4

other dummy variables representing different market structures are

listed in Table 1.

5

The farms producing for market are not easily distinguishable from

those that do not.

While they do have fewer household members per hectare

(34 adults compared with 42), the difference is not significant.

Nor

are the differences between average terms of trade, distance from market,
availability of transport etc. significant.

Perhaps an omitted variable,

such as soil fertility, is the crucial factor.

6

This is attributable to the fact that very few zones have a significant

number of units using train or cart transport.
report any transport mode.
primitive "back of man."

Some of the units failed to

By far the most frequently used was the most

BIBLIOr.RAPHY

[1]

Baute, Joseph. "Zaire." In Croissance demographique et evolution socio
economique en afrique de l'ouest, pp. 803-828. Ed. John C. Caldwell et
al. New York: The Population Council, 1973.

[2]

Brooks, Hugh C. and El-Avouty, Yassin, eds., Refugees South of the
S<!._1:1._ara: An African Dilemma. Contributions in Afro-American and African
Studies, No. 4. Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970.

[3]

Congo helge and Republique du Congo. Enquete demographique, 1955-57.
Nos. 1-12, published by different government entities in Leopoldville
from 1957-61.

[4]

Congo belge. Gouverneur general. Bulletin annuel des statistiques
du Congo belge, 1959. Leopoldville. Statistical appendix contains
data for 1959 administrative census.

[5]

Gourou, Pierre. "La densite de la population rurale au Congo belge."
Academie royale des Sciences coloniales, Classe des Sciences naturelles
et medicales. Memoires in-8•,Nouvelle serie, I, fasc. 2. Brussels, 1955.

[6]

Harris, John R. and Todaro, Michael P. "Migration, Unemployment and
Development: A Two'-Sector Analysis." American Economic Review, LX,
No. 1 (March, 1970), 126-142.

[ 7]

Huybrechts,
Andre. "Les routes et le trafic routier au Congo." Cahiers
.,,.
economiques et sociaux, V, No. 3, ( Septembre 196 7). Institut de Recherches
Economiques et Sociales, Universite Lovanium de Kinshasa.

[8]

- , , . . - - - - - - - - · Transports et structures de developpement au Congo:
Etude du progres, economique de 1900 a 1970.
Recherches Africaines
XII. Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Universite
Lovanium de Kinshasa. Paris: Mouton 1970.

[9]

Hecq, J.A., A. Lefebvre, and E. Vercruysse.
Agriculture
et structures
.
..
economiques d'une societe traditionnelle au Kivu (Congo). Publications
de l'Institut National pour l'Etude Agronomique du Congo, Serie
Scientifique No. 113. Brussels, 1963.

[10]

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Agricultural
Sector Survey: Republic of Zaire (in three volumes, restricted).

[11]

Pease, Steven M. "The Spatial Agricultural Economy: A Theoretical
Study with Special Reference to Brazil," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Yale University, 1973.

[12]

McCabe, James. "The Distribution of Labor Incomes in Urban Zaire."
Review of Income and Wealth, XX, No. 1 (March, 1974), 71-87.

/

~

,

/

✓

(13]

Republic of Zaire. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and
FAO. World Agricultural Census, 1970. Original data.

[ 14 J

Republique Democratique du Congo. Presidence de la Rifouhlique. Office.
Ins ti tut National <le
National de la Recherche et du De.veloppement.
la Statistique. Etude Socio-Demographique de Kinshasa 1967: Rapport
General. Kinshasa-, May, 1969.

[ 15]

part i r des nfsul tats
_______ • Recueil de rapports et totaux. calcules
?ff~~els du recensement de la population_de la R.D.C. en 1970.

[16]

Romaniuk, Anatole. "The-Demography of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo~" In The Demogr~of Tropical Africa, pp. 241-31'1. Ed. William
Brass et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

[17]

_ _ _ • La 'Fecondite des Populations Congolaises. Univcrsite Catholique
de Louvain, Fa cul te des- Sciences Economiques, S-ociales et Politiques, ·
Nouvelle Serie No. 9. Paris: ~fouton, 1967.

fl8]

St. Moulin, Leon. "Les Statistiques <lemographiques en R.D.C," __ Congo
377-385. Centre d'Etudes
Afrique, X, No. 47 (ao~t-septembre 1970):
pour l'Action Sociale, Kinshasa.

[19]

-,.----- and Ducreux, Maurice. "Le phenomene urbain .i Kinshasa."
(octobr~-decembre 1969 ): 125-127.
Etudes congolaises, XII, no. 4

[20]

Sys, C. and R, Tavernier. ''Cla·ssification of the Soils of the Republic
of the Congo (Kinshasa).'' Pe'dologie, International Symposium, 3:
Soil Classification, 1965, pp. 91-136.

[21]

"The Economics of Road User Charges." International Bank
Walters, A.A.
for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Staff Occasional Papers
Number Five. Balt~more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

a

